Full proofs of the Gödel incompleteness theorems are highly intricate affairs.
We note that for classical theories propositions in the above sense form a Boolean algebra, but for the intuitionistic theories which we shall have in mind propositions constitute a Heyting algebra, that is, a (distributive) lattice (L, , , ) with top and bottom elements 1, 0 equipped with a binary operation  satisfying x  y  z iff x  y  z. We define the operations  and  by x = x  0 and x  y = (x  y)  (y  x). When the elements of a Heyting algebra are regarded as propositions arising from a theory, the relation  represents entailment and the operations , , , , , 0, 1 represent conjunction, disjunction, implication, negation, bi-implication, and refutable and provable propositions, respectively. For a proposition a, the assertion that a = 1 expresses the condition that a is provable. The consistency of the theory is expressed by the assertion that 0  1, that is , by the assertion that its corresponding algebra of propositions has at least two elements. 2 For definiteness we could take our background theory to be Zermelo set theory formulated within intuitionistic first-order logic. For much of the development in the paper, one may take classical set theory as background theory and note that no use of the law of excluded middle is made. 3 The exponential X Y of two sets X, Y is the set of functions from Y to X. We shall call a sextuple A = (, C, , K, L, k,) subject to the above data a coding assemblage. If () has at least two elements, A is said to be consistent.
We now assume a fixed coding assemblage A to be given.
for all   . In this sense f can be represented, up to -equivalence, as a (coded) function of codes. Such a map  is called a coding representation for f. Given   K,
That is, a subset of   containing the identity map on  and closed under composition.
 † preserves , we shall say that  is equable. Clearly, if  is equable,  † is then codable.
Self-maps on  induced by codable -preserving self-maps on  are called codable self-maps on .
We can now prove Proposition 1. The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) every logical map on  is codable;
(ii) the identity map 1  on  is codable. Our next task is to prove a fixed point lemma.
Let us call a self-map f on  diagonalizable if, for some   K, we have
Lemma 1.
(i) Any diagonalizable self-map on  has a -fixed point.
(ii) The composite of a diagonalizable -preserving map with a logical map has a -fixed point.
is easily seen to be a -fixed point for f.
(ii) Let f be a diagonalizable -preserving self-map on  and p a logical map. Then, as observed above, p  f is diagonalizable and so, by (i), has a -fixed
(ii) K is closed under composition with d on the right: if   K,
Lemma 2. If A has a diagonal map, then every codable self-map on  is diagonalizable.
Proof. Given a codable self -map f on  with coding representation
So * is a diagonal representation for f, and the latter is accordingly diagonalizable. 
Lemmas 1 and 2 immediately yield the
Fixed Point Lemma. Suppose that the coding assemblage A has a diagonal map.
Then:
(i) Any codable self-map on  has a -fixed point.
(ii) The composite of a -preserving self-map on  with a logical map has a -fixed point. Assuming that P is consistent, it follows, as observed above, that P has no Tarski map, and so truth in P is undefinable in P.
2. Intuitionistic set theory. Just as in classical set theory the power set PA of any set A is a Boolean algebra under the usual set-theoretic operations, so in intuitionistic set theory the power set is, under the same operations, a Heyting algebra. In particular, writing 1 for the one-element set {0}, P1 is a Heyting algebra which we shall denote by . If  is a sentence of the language of set theory, we write {0|} for the element {x: x = 0  } of . From the axiom of extensionality it follows that {0|} = {0|} iff   . Thus the elements of 
correspond naturally to what we have termed propositions, in this case, to 5 Thus  may be regarded as the set of sentences of L identified up to provable equivalence from P. 6 See, e.g. Now let us attempt to build a coding assemblage using  as the underlying set of sentences and the identity relation as the underlying equivalence relation. Here it is natural to take C, the set of codes, to be any set containing at least one element, and to take L =   and K =  C . Using the observation immediately above, we may then identify K with PC. Take the coding map k to be an arbitrary map PC  C; for X  PC, write X for k(X).
For   , the constant map : C   is correlated with the element * = {xC: 0  } of PC; it will be convenient to write  for *. The map   :
  C is the coding map on .
The sextuple Q = (, C, =, PC,   , k) is accordingly a coding assemblage.
Does Q have a diagonal map? As we shall see, this cannot be done when the coding map on  satisfies the modest requirement of being injective 7 .
In fact, if  is injective, a diagonal map d would then have to satisfy
for X  PC. Now define 7 The modesty of this requirement is more easily seen when the background theory is classical (i.e. the law of excluded middle holds). For then  = {, 1} and injectivity of  boils down simply to   1: that is, the true and the false receive different codes.
Then, using (*) and the injectivity of ,
and we have a contradiction.
We now turn to Gödel's theorems. Henceforth we shall assume that the coding assemblage A has a diagonal map d.
We have seen that every codable self-map f on  has a -fixed point. Let us call an element    a strong -fixed point for f if, for all   , we have
We next prove another version of the Fixed Point Lemma, namely, the Strong Fixed Point Lemma. Suppose that  has a codable -preserving self-map f with a strong -fixed point . Then, for any logical map p on  there is    such that
Proof. By the Fixed Point Lemma, f  p has a -fixed point . We then have, using (*),
Now we can formulate Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem in the present setting. Here we require  to have a distinguished element : we think of  as representing the provable sentences in the sense that the provable sentences are taken to be precisely those --equivalent to . We suppose given an equable map   K which we shall term a provability map, in the sense that, for each   , the element () of  shall be construed as the sentence  is provable. The selfmap g on  induced by  is then necessarily codable (as well as -preserving).
We shall call g a Gödel map if it has  as a strong -fixed point. If g is a Gödel map, then the provability map  satisfies
This may be construed as asserting that a sentence  is provable iff the sentence () asserting the provability of  is itself provable. Notice that the self-map on  induced by a Tarski map is a Gödel map.
Now call a coding assemblage Gödelian if it is consistent, has a Gödel map,
and there is an element  of  such that    together with a logical map  on  such that ()   and ()  .
We think of  as the negation operation on sentences and  as representing the refutable sentences.
We can now prove
Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem. The set of propositions of any Gödelian coding assemblage has at least three elements.
Proof. Given a Gödelian coding assemblage there is, by the Strong Fixed Point
Lemma, an element    for which ()      . In that case     , and thus  has the three distinct elements , , .  An element    such that      evidently represents an undecidable sentence, so the theorem just proved may be taken to assert that any Gödelian coding assemblage contains undecidable sentences.
All this applies in particular to the Peano coding assemblage P. Let  be the sentence 0 = 0, and  the sentence 0 = 1. Also let Prov be a provability predicate for P. Then, by standard arguments 8 , we have, for any arithmetical sentences , ,
Now let : N   be the map n  Prov(n).
It follows from (Prov2) that  is equable, and from (Prov1) that the map g:    induced by  has  as a strong -fixed point. Accordingly g is is a Gödel map for P. Assuming that P is consistent, P is then Gödelian, and accordingly contains undecidable propositions.
Finally let us set about formulating Gödel's Second Incompleteness
Theorem in the present setting. To do this we need to introduce the concept of a Hilbert-Bernays-Löb, or HBL-operator. Let us assume that A is a coding assemblage in which  is a Heyting algebra 9 . An HBL-operator in A is a codable self-map  on  satisfying the conditions:
An HBL-operator may be considered a modal operator satisfying the K4 axioms 10 . It follows quite easily from (a) and (b) that  preserves  , and hence is also order-preserving.
We may think of  as a provability operator acting on propositions: for each proposition x, x is the proposition asserting "x is provable". In that case (a) above asserts: if x is a provable proposition, then so is the proposition "x is provable"; (b) asserts: the proposition "x implies y is provable" implies the proposition '"x is provable" implies "y is provable"'; and (c) asserts: the proposition "x is provable" implies the proposition "'x is provable' is provable". Now let us call a coding assemblage A suitable 11 if (i)  is a Heyting algebra with an HBL operator and (ii) for each a   the map x  (x  a):
We can now prove a version of Löb's Theorem 12 . Let A be a suitable coding assemblage with HBL-operator .
Then, for any a  
(ii) a  a  a = 1.
10 See [4] , p. 5. 11 I.e., suitable for proving Gödel's second incompleteness theorem: see below. 12 Theorem 4.1.1 of [6] .
Point Lemma has a fixed point b. That is,
 a (by (**)).
This gives (i).
For (ii), we assume a  a, so that (a  a) =1. It now follows from (i) that
Therefore a = 1, and since a  a, we conclude that a = 1.  
Proof. By Löb's Theorem
On the other hand 0  0 so that (**) 0  0.
(*) and (**) give 0 = 0, and so is 0 a fixed point of the map x  x.
To see that 0 is the only fixed point, suppose that a = a. Then (***) a = a  0.
Also a  a = a, so that a  a  a, whence
Therefore 0  a , so that, by (***), a = a = 0.  From (i) of Löb's Theorem we see that  satisfies the so-called GL (Gödel-Löb)
axiom 13 for a normal modal logic, i.e. the scheme
From Löb's Theorem one derives:
Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem. Given a suitable consistent coding assemblage A with HBL operator . Then, for any x  , x  0; or equivalently, x  1. In particular, 0  0; or equivalently 0  1.
Proof. If x = 0, then 0  x = 0; hence by Löb's theorem 0 = 1, and it follows that A is inconsistent.  Consider again the Peano assemblage P. There  is a Heyting algebra and conditions Prov1-3 on the provability predicate imply that the self-map  on  induced by the Gödel map g is an HBL-operator. 14 It is also easily checked for each a   the map x  (x  a):    is codable. Accordingly P is suitable, and so the 2 nd incompleteness theorem applies to it.
If we think of  as a provability operator, x is the proposition "x is unprovable", so that x = 1 may be taken as asserting the provability of "x is unprovable". In that case the second incompleteness theorem, may be taken to assert that in any suitable consistent coding assemblage, there is no proposition whose unprovability is provable. This appies, in particular, to the proposition 0, so that it is unprovable that "0 is unprovable" Now "0 is unprovable" means "no refutable proposition is also provable", and it is natural to paraphrase this as " A is internally consistent". This terminology enables the second incompleteness theorem as stated above to assume a more familiar form: in any suitable 13 See [5] , p. 5.
14 Prov1 actually asserts the stronger condition x = 1  x = 1, which does not hold for HBL-operators in general.
consistent coding assemblage, its internal consistency is unprovable. This applies in particular to the Peano assemblage.
The idea of internal consistency can be extended to the following concordance:
Proposition Paraphrase
0
A is internally inconsistent
0
A is internally consistent
0
A is weakly internally inconsistent
0
A is provably internally consistent
0
A is not provably internally consistent
In each case, the claim that the proposition is equal to the top element 1 of  is correlated with an assertion about A : for example, 0 = 1 with the assertion "A is internally inconsistent" and similarly for the others.
In this spirit, consider (*) of Corollary 2, namely the inequality 0  0. This is equivalent to (0  0) = 1, which may be paraphrased:
in A, internal consistency implies the unprovability of internal consistency . This is an internal version of Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem.
In this same spirit, Corollary 2 itself may be translated as: A is internally consistent is the unique proposition equivalent to the assertion of its own unprovability. And (he last claim) of Corollary 1 translates as: if, in A, every proposition implies its own provability, then A is weakly internally inconsistent.
Finally, we observe that consistency and internal inconsistency are compatible.
This follows from the fact that the by the HBL-operator  can be taken to be identically 1 -in other words, every proposition can be taken to satisfy the internal condition "__ is provable" . All this shows is that internal consistency need have little to do with consistency, or, more generally, that provability maps need have little to do with provability 15 .
In conclusion, it should be pointed out that while in stating and proving these results we have used ordinary set-theoretic language, they can be formulated in toposes (see, e.g. [2] ) or more general categories (cf. the discussion in [10] ).
